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JOHN STINSON*
Republic Properties Corp. v. Mission West
Properties, L.P.: Discouraging Forum Shopping in
Maryland by Properly Implementing the Entity
Theory of Partnerships
IN REPUBLIC PROPERTIES CoRp. V. MISSION WEST PROPERTIES, L.P.,' the Court of
Appeals of Maryland considered novel questions of civil procedure and liability
under the state's relatively new uniform partnership act. First, the Court considered
whether a Maryland state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign
limited partnership whose only connection to the state is its general partner's re-
incorporation there.' Secondly, the Court examined whether that Maryland-incor-
porated general partner may be held liable for the actions of the foreign limited
partnership in a dispute among the partners of a second and distinct foreign lim-
ited partnership
On the first issue, the Court held that the Maryland incorporation of a partner
to a foreign limited partnership does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction over that
foreign limited partnership because partnerships are distinct legal entities from
their partner members.4 The Court also held that serving process on the perceived
Maryland "agent" of a foreign limited partnership alone was not sufficient to grant
jurisdiction to a state court over that foreign limited partnership.' On the second
issue, the Court held that the Maryland general partner of a foreign limited part-
nership will not bear liability for the conduct of that limited partnership in a dis-
pute among members of a separate partnership in a different state.6
The Court's holdings assert the "entity theory" of partnerships espoused in the
Maryland Revised Uniform Partnership Act.7 This important doctrine reflects con-
. J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2008; M.A., Writing Seminars, Johns
Hopkins University; B.A., Kenyon College.
1. 895 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2006).
2. Id. at 1008.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1013-14.
5. Id. at 1023.
6. Id.
7. Mo. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-201 (LexisNexis 2006).
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temporary business practices and expectations! While the entity theory has been
adopted by a large majority of states, it is not always uniformly implemented.9 The
Court of Appeals's decision in Republic Properties correctly established and clarified
Maryland's use of the doctrine, particularly in the confusing procedural arena of
personal jurisdiction. Most importantly, the decision announced that Maryland
courts discourage forum shopping by out-of-state plaintiffs in business disputes
that have attenuated links to the state.
I. THE CASE
The owners of Stellex Microwave Systems, Inc., a high-tech communications firm,
wanted to move the company's headquarters to the Silicon Valley region of Califor-
nia.' o Unable to obtain suitable financing, the owners of Stellex recruited members
of Republic Properties Corporation and approached Carl Berg, a Silicon Valley real
estate developer." These three business groups forged an agreement that resulted in
the creation of the Hellyer Avenue Limited Partnership (HALP) in the summer of
2000.12 HALP consisted roughly of two sides. On one side, Carl Berg's partnership,
called Mission West Limited Partnership (MWLP), served as a general partner and
controlled 50 percent of HALP. 3 On the other side, Republic Properties Corpora-
tion served as a general partner and the various entities and individuals who owned
Stellex Microwave served as limited partners (hereinafter collectively referred to as
Republic). Together, this side controlled 50 percent of HALP. 4
HALP was a joint-venture limited partnership that the parties formed to con-
struct and maintain a headquarters for Stellex Microwave on land owned by Berg. 5
The HALP agreement conditioned membership of all partners, except MWLP, on
payment of all Stellex's obligations under the lease. 6 Berg claimed that Stellex
breached the HALP agreement by failing to pay one of his construction companies
for services rendered. 7 MWLP, Berg's half of the HALP partnership, then claimed
to expel the Republic partners and refused to pay them distributions from HALP's
income."m The Republic partners protested that the work done by Berg's construc-
tion company was outside of the lease, and that nonpayment was an issue apart
8. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT prefatory statement (1997).
9. Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New Era of Limited Liability Entities-
Should Business Entities Have a Fifth Amendment Privilege? 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 91-93.
10. Mission W. Props., L.P. v. Republic Props. Corp., 873 A.2d 372, 374 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005), aff'd,
895 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2006).
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from the HALP agreement." All disputed agreements and activities took place in
California."°
Republic filed suit against MWLP in Maryland in the Circuit Court for Balti-
more City."' MWLP was created as a limited partnership under Delaware law and
maintained a principal place of business in California.22 MWLP itself included a
general partner, Mission West Properties, Inc. (MWI), that was incorporated in
Maryland and maintained its principal place of business in California. 3 As required
for Maryland incorporation,24 MWI maintained a registered agent in the state."
Republic opted to sue MWLP through MWI in Maryland after serving process on
MWI's agent, even though the corporation was not a party to the HALP agree-
ment." Republic sought (1) a judgment that MWLP, acting through MWI,
breached the HALP agreement; and (2) damages in the amount of the unpaid
HALP distributions.27 MWLP and MWI filed a counterclaim seeking a judgment
that Republic breached the HALP agreement." MWLP and MWI also filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. 9
The circuit court denied MWLP's motion to dismiss, concluding that the pres-
ence of MWI's agent in Maryland exposed it and MWLP to the authority of state
courts."° Following a week-long bench trial, the circuit court entered judgments in
favor of Republic on both the complaint and counterclaim, holding that MWLP
breached the HALP agreement, and that MWLP and MWI were jointly and sever-
ally liable for damages.3' MWLP and MWI appealed the denial of their motion to
dismiss and the trial court's decision on the merits of the case.32 On appeal, the
19. Id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals opened its opinion with a paragraph summarizing the
complexity and convoluted nature of the facts:
In this case, the parties involved include a publicly traded California real estate investment trust
(REIT), six corporations, two limited partnerships, two trusts, a limited liability company, and five
businessmen. The parties serve as general or limited partners, or officers or directors of the others.
Further complicating matters, the litigants' dispute hinges upon the interrelationships among five
contracts running between various permutations of the several parties. In short, we must disentangle
a maze of interconnected business entities and determine their relationships en route to a resolution
of this appeal.
Id. at 373.
20. Id. at 374-77.
21. Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props., L.P., 895 A.2d 1006, 1009 (Md. 2006).
22. Id.
23. Id. MWI was originally incorporated in California. Id. In 1999, Berg re-incorporated MWI in Mary-
land. Id.
24. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 2-108 (LexisNexis 2006).
25. Republic Props., 895 A.2d at 1009.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Mission W. Props., L.P. v. Republic Props. Corp., 873 A.2d 372, 373 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005), aff'd,
895 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2006).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 376.
31. Id. at 377.
32. Id. at 373-74.
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Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the circuit court lacked personal
jurisdiction over MWLP and vacated the judgment against both defendants." Re-
public appealed and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to clarify
how state courts will apply Maryland partnership law when determining whether
they can assert jurisdiction over a defendant to a lawsuit.34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Republic Properties implicated an admixture of substantive partnership law with
state and federal procedural doctrine concerning personal jurisdiction and service
of process.3" Partnership law has developed in Maryland from a common law doc-
trine to a uniform statutory system that better serves the needs of contemporary
commerce.36 Personal jurisdiction doctrine likewise has evolved, over the last fifty
years of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, into a procedural system bet-
ter suited to the realities of a country populated by business entities. 7 Lastly, states
like Maryland have enacted long-arm statutes and procedural rules governing per-
sonal jurisdiction both to comport with due process and to ensure proper legal
recourse for citizens who evince legal claims against nonresident persons and enti-
ties.3" Courts review procedural issues alongside the substantive state law of busi-
ness associations because intrastate changes to and interstate differences in the
latter directly impact the reach and posture of state authority.
39
A. Legal Status of Partnerships and Limited Partnerships
The law of partnerships has changed significantly in the last one hundred years
from a strictly common law doctrine to a series of statutory schemes that seek to
meet the needs of contemporary commerce.4 ° Our federal system, however, has not
produced a wholly uniform legal treatment of this business form.4' Further, under-
standing of core changes to the legal conception of partnerships as business entities
33. Id. at 374.
34. Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props., L.P., 895 A.2d 1006, 1009 (Md. 2006).
35. Id. at 1012-13. Judge Harrell opened the opinion by applying a famous quote by Winston Churchill to
the complex doctrine of personal jurisdiction: "lIt's] a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Id. at
1008. Judge Harrell gave short shrift to his literary reference by not applying it to the case as a whole. Republic
Properties did end up being a riddle (personal jurisdiction doctrine), wrapped in a mystery (Maryland long-
arm statute and process rules), inside an enigma (a lawsuit implicating Maryland partnership law).
36. Id. at 1013.
37. Id. at 1015-19.
38. Id. at 1012, 1014.
39. See, e.g., Wench Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1992).
40. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.02(a), (b)
(2006).
41. Clay B. Wortham, Note, Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Anomalies of a Simplified, Modernized Part-
nership Law, 92 Ky. L.J. 1083, 1084 (2004).
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proliferates slowly and can clash with other longstanding legal and procedural
doctrines."2
Common law conceived of a partnership as an aggregation of its members; con-
sequently, a partnership enjoyed no legal status apart from those members. 3 To
illustrate, if A and B formed Carroll Cleaners as a partnership, the law viewed A
and B as the partnership and as its partners; the law would not view Carroll Clean-
ers as the partnership with A and B as partners." This doctrine likely reflected the
majority uses of the partnership form for mostly local businesses operated directly
by small groups of owners.
An expansion in the creation of partnerships in the nineteenth century revealed
problems with the "aggregate theory."" Accounting rules, property assessments,
insurance, and other legal and regulatory requirements of the modern mercantile
state urged a new view of partnerships as entities with limited autonomy.46 The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the first
Uniform Partnership Act in 1902, seeking to promulgate the "mercantile" or "entity
theory" of partnership that viewed such associations as legal entities distinct from
their partner members." Nevertheless, the document returned to the aggregate the-
ory by the time of its release in 1914.48 States continued to view partnerships and
limited partnerships as aggregations of their members and carved out exceptions to
this view only under particular circumstances.4 9 Today, that concept persists in
some jurisdictions."5
In 1998, Maryland adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 5' (RUPA) and
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.12 Both laws expressly assert that
42. Segars v. McCormick, 55 P.3d 470, 471 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 5.08(a) (2002)).
43. McLane v. Judges of App. Tax Ct., 143 A. 656, 660 (Md. 1928).
44. See David v. David, 157 A. 755, 757 (Md. 1932), abrogated by Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450 (Md.
2003). In David, the wife of one partner in a wallpaper firm was badly injured when she fell into an elevator
shaft on the business premises. Id. at 755. The partner's wife could only recover a payment through the con-
cern's insurance if she could establish that the partnership was an entity apart from her husband, who she
legally could not sue. Id. at 756. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the partnership was not an entity
distinct from the plaintiff's husband. Id. at 757.
45. McLane, 143 A. at 660; see also BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 40, §§ 1.02(b), 103(a).
46. McLane, 143 A. at 660; see also ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VESTAL & DONALD J. WEIDNER, THE
REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201, Authors' Comments (2006).
47. REVISED UNIF. P'sHip ACT prefatory statement (1997).
48. Id.
49. McLane, 143 A. at 661 (holding that the Maryland Legislature declared a partnership to be a legal
entity for purposes of taxation and assessment by adopting the Uniform Partnership Act).
50. See, e.g., N.Y. P'SHiP LAW § 10 (Consol. 1994); Williams v. Hartshorn, 69 N.E.2d 557, 559 (N.Y. 1946);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.05 (LexisNexis 2006); Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (Ohio
1994).
51. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-101 (LexisNexis 2006). A total of thirty-eight states adopted
the RUPA by 1998.
52. Id. §§ 10-10-10-1105. The RULPA was devised as an "attachment" to the RUPA of 1997. UNiF. LTD.
P'SHIP ACT prefatory statement (2001). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has subsequently adopted a new "stand alone" act. Id. Maryland has not yet adopted this ULPA.
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partnerships53 and limited partnerships 4 are entities distinct from their partner
members. Uniform partnership and limited partnership laws tend to encourage
those having capital to partner with those having the skill to launch viable enter-
prises by limiting the liability of investors and protecting third parties doing busi-
ness with the enterprise.55 In Creel v. Lilly, 6 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
ratified the state's adoption of the "entity theory" as a flexible and modern concep-
tion of partnerships and limited partnerships that is "more consistent with the rea-
sonable expectations of commercial entities in today's business world."" In Della
Ratta v. Larkin,5" the Court noted that, while controversial, the new uniform laws
eliminated harsh procedures and liabilities that formerly bound partnerships. 9
Under RUPA, states like Maryland view partnerships as distinct legal entities that
exist between partners and the assets of the partnership. 5 A partner's interest con-
sists of a bundle of rights and liabilities separate from the entity of the partnership
itself.6' Consequently, a partnership can now sue or be sued in its own name and
automatically exists beyond the death or severance of a partner.62 Application of the
entity theory is not absolute, however, and doctrines like fiduciary duty and per-
sonal liability for partnership obligations still resemble longstanding concepts that
more directly implicate partners.63 There has been a fundamental shift, though,
from a primarily aggregate viewpoint on partnerships with some entity elements to
a viewpoint that is predominantly entity-based with some exceptions where the
aggregate theory must apply.64 This model promotes stability in partnerships and
simplifies management.65 RUPA drafters assert that, in time, the entity theory will
simplify legal analysis because courts will address partnerships more like they ad-
dress other business associations.66 Practically speaking, this updated viewpoint
53. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 9A-201.
54. Id. § 10-108 (establishing that Title 9 of the Corporations and Associations article applies to limited
partnerships). In addition, Maryland law affords greater legal protection to limited partnerships by establishing
that "a limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless the limited partner is also
a general partner ... or he takes part in the control of the business." Id. § 10-303.
55. 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 403 (2007).
56. 729 A.2d 385 (Md. 1999).
57. Id. at 393.
58. 856 A.2d 643 (Md. 2004).
59. Id. at 650.
60. HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 46, § 201, Authors' Comments.
61. Id.
62. MD. CooE ANN., CoRPs. & Ass'Ns § 9A-307(a) (LexisNexis 2006). Nowadays, the unfortunate Mrs.
David, from David v. David, would have recourse to sue her husband's partnership for an insurance payment
even if the arcane law disallowing inter-spousal tort litigation still existed in 2006. 157 A. 755, 757 (Md. 1932),
overruled by Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 550 A.2d 947 (Md. 1988).
63. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'N S §§ 9A-306, 404(a). In terms of personal liability, it is noteworthy,
though, that RUPA (as adopted by states like Maryland) contains a requirement that creditors exhaust partner-
ship assets before moving against partners personally. In this way, RUPA maintains the entity theory to its
fullest extent while not abandoning the traditional conception of direct liability for general partners.
64. HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 46, § 201, Authors' Comments.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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supports the realities and expectations of the contemporary business marketplace
where partnerships may be multi-state associations that carry on a wider range of
business than one hundred years ago.67
Certain areas of law, apart from the substantive law of business associations, use
the aggregate theory for purposes of equity and administrability of those particular
legal doctrines. For example, courts sometimes manage the impact of insurance
coverage on partnerships through an aggregate view in order to promote fairness.6"
Tax law applies under the aggregate theory in that a partnership pays no taxes as an
entity. Instead, profits "pass through" to partners who then are taxed individually.6"
In C.T. Carden v. Arkoma Associates,70 the Supreme Court sustained the traditional
common law view when assessing the citizenship of partnerships for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction because our constitutional system discourages expansion of
federal court reach into areas of state authority.7 Accordingly, litigation involving
partnerships requires real care in determining what theory of this business entity is
at play in the jurisdiction as well as within each legal issue.
B. Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine
Shortly after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court as-
serted in Pennoyer v. Neff72 the traditional bases for courts to claim jurisdiction
over an individual: physical presence in the state or ownership of property in dis-
pute in the state." The Court quickly discovered that business entities presented
unique problems for this doctrine and held that states could require corporations
to make themselves "legally available" if they chose to conduct business in the juris-
diction.74 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington," the Court adopted the "mini-
mum contacts" doctrine, acknowledging the realities of modern life and
commercial activity.76 The minimum contacts doctrine established that courts
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Watson v. Agway Ins. Co., 677 A.2d 788, 794 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
69. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW & PRACTICE § 2:3 (2006).
70. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
71. Id. at 195. In C.T. Carden, the Supreme Court asserted that the states have created "a wide assortment
of artificial entities possessing different powers and characteristics." Id. at 197. When making subject matter
jurisdiction determinations, however, the Court found that federal courts should employ just two categories:
corporations and "common law" associations. Id. at 189. The common law associations are viewed under the
aggregate theory of partnerships. Id. at 190. This view, however, is limited to subject matter jurisdiction, an
area of procedure where federal courts must construe relevant factors broadly in favor of not granting jurisdic-
tion. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002).
72. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S 186, 212 n.39 (1997).
73. Id. at 733-34. The Court limited a state's authority to hale an individual into court to three types of
jurisdiction: in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem. Id.
74. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882).
75. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
76. Id. at 316. The case concerned the actions of a Missouri corporation's part-time sales force in Wash-
ington. Id. at 313-14. Though the doctrine applies equally to individuals and fictional legal entities, it radically
changed the legal relationship between business associations and states.
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could claim jurisdiction over non-resident defendants when such persons or enti-
ties maintained sufficient substantive contacts with the state, or directed activities
at the forum, such that they should reasonably expect to be haled into court there."
It effectively did away with the Pennoyer conception of personal jurisdiction in
favor of a court-based determination based on evidence and argument regarding
whether "fair play and substantial justice" would permit a court to exercise
jurisdiction."
Despite this change, the physical presence of an individual-or the statutorily-
authorized agent of a business association-in a jurisdiction never lost its primacy
in personal jurisdiction law. In Burnham v. Superior Court,79 the Supreme Court
held that direct service of process on an individual in a state stands as a traditional
way to obtain personal jurisdiction regardless of whether more substantial contacts
exist."0 The legal status of business associations, however, complicates the "personal
service" rule because the Supreme Court has held that the mere presence of any
association agent in a jurisdiction does not grant state courts jurisdiction over that
business entity.8' Minimum contacts or an agent designated to receive process are
required.82
C. Maryland Law Concerning Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Process
Maryland, like all states, must balance constitutional due process concerns with its
own desire to assert full sovereignty and to protect its citizens and their interests.83
The state maintains a "long-arm" statute, establishing that its courts may claim
personal jurisdiction over any individual or entity domiciled in, primarily located
in, served process in, or organized under the laws of the state, among other consid-
erations.84 Maryland also established laws governing service of process, including a
specific provision recognizing service of a limited partnership through its resident
agent or any general partner or person "impliedly authorized to receive process."85
In addition, Maryland law allows state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
persons served with process in the state. 6 The state tempers this rule and others by
establishing that such procedural rules can neither extend nor limit the jurisdiction
77. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
78. Id. at 474-76.
79. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
80. Id. at 621-22.
81. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-47 (1952); see also Siemer v. Learjet Acqui-
sition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the Burnham rule does not apply to business
associations).
82. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 446-47.
83. See generally Bernard Auerbach, The "Long Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 MD. L. REV. 13 (1966).
84. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 6-101 to 6-104 (LexisNexis 2006). The section of the "long-
arm" statute examined in the instant case was MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-102.
85. MD. RULE 2-124(f) (2007).
86. MD. CODE ANN., CTS, & JtD. PROC. § 6-102(a).
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of any court.87 The goal of these statutory schemes is to maximize state authority
while ensuring fundamental fairness and justice in litigation.88 Secondarily, proce-
dural and jurisdictional law can discourage forum-shopping by plaintiffs by al-
lowing courts to dismiss cases that do not belong in the state.89
Correct application of service rules with the long-arm statute and the concerns
of due process can elude trial courts, so the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
clarified how the procedural pieces interact in Springle v. Cottrell Engineering
Corp.90 In order to ensure a proper claim of jurisdiction, state courts must evaluate
(1) whether a defendant was properly served with process; (2) whether the defen-
dant meets one or more of the Maryland long-arm criteria; and (3) whether the
claim of jurisdiction comports with the minimum contacts doctrine.9'
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Republic Properties Corp. v. Mission West Properties, L.P., the Court of Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, holding that (1) a
foreign limited partnership does not become an automatic domiciliary of Maryland
because its general partner was incorporated there;9 2 and (2) service of process
within the state upon the resident agent of a domestic corporate general partner of
a foreign limited partnership does not confer personal jurisdiction over the foreign
limited partnership in a Maryland court.93 Writing for a unanimous Court, Judge
Harrell asserted that Maryland courts will uphold the "entity theory" over the com-
mon law "aggregate theory" of partnerships and limited partnerships when apply-
ing most legal doctrines, including the law of personal jurisdiction.94
The Court began by analyzing Republic's theory that Maryland courts could
claim jurisdiction over MWLP because its general partner, MWI, re-incorporated
in Maryland and thus made both entities domiciliaries under the traditional view
of partnerships.95 The Court of Appeals looked directly to state partnership law and
asserted that the entity theory applied in Maryland, making partnerships distinct
legal entities for the purposes of personal jurisdiction.96 The Court distinguished
C. T. Carden,97 finding that it applied only to federal court determinations for diver-
sity jurisdiction.98 Accordingly, the Court found that Maryland could assert juris-
87. MD. RULE 1-201(b).
88. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 710-11 (4th Cir. 2002).
89. Naylor v. Naylor, 143 A.2d 604, 610 (Md. 1958).
90. 391 A.2d 456 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
91. Id. at 469.
92. Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props., L.P., 895 A.2d 1006, 1014 (Md. 2006).
93. Id. at 1022.
94. Id. at 1013.
95. Id. at 1012.
96. Id. at 1013 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-201 (1975, 1999 Repl. Vol.)).
97. 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990).
98. Republic Props., 895 A.2d at 1013.
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diction over MWI as a business entity incorporated in the state, but not over
MWLP because it was incorporated in Delaware and domiciled in California."
The Court then turned to Republic's claim that MWLP was properly served with
process in Maryland and that such action conferred jurisdiction to state courts."
The Court of Appeals assumed that service comported with the requirements of
Maryland law and that MWLP could be served through MWI' 0' The Court found,
however, that service alone was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over MWLP.'5 2
The rules of service do not circumscribe the limits of jurisdiction in Maryland," 3
nor does service upon a legally-recognized agent of a business entity create the kind
of "tag" jurisdiction upheld in Burnham."'4 After canvassing personal jurisdiction
doctrine since Pennoyer and affirming the applicable Maryland requirements,' the
Court of Appeals determined that service of process alone does not confer jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation." 6 The Court then asserted that Maryland courts
should view foreign limited partnerships just like they view foreign corporations
when determining personal jurisdiction.0 7 Lastly, the Court of Appeals found that
Republic's suit against MWLP did not meet the requirements of the Maryland
long-arm statute or the due process protections of International Shoe.' MWLP, in
essence, lacked minimum contacts with Maryland as an entity, despite the incorpo-
ration of its general partner in the state. Accordingly, MWLP was not subject to the
jurisdiction of Maryland courts.
The Court of Appeals closed its opinion by stating that Maryland courts could
obtain jurisdiction over MWI as a business entity incorporated under the laws of
the state, but that the judgment and damages against MWI could not stand.' 9 The
record revealed that MWI never was an alleged wrongdoer in the dispute over the
HALP agreement. The judgment against MWI, then, was based solely on its posi-
99. Id. at 1013-14.
100. Id. at 1014. Republic asserted that MWLP maintained no direct resident agent in Maryland, but that
Maryland Rule 2-124(f) allowed them to serve "any general partner or other person expressly or impliedly
authorized to receive service of process." Id. Under Republic's theory, MWI was that general partner authorized
to receive process for MWLP. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1015.
103. Id. at 1015 (citing Mo. RULE 1-201(b) (2003)).
104. Id. at 1016. The Court stated that "Burnham was confined to circumstances where service of process
was made upon a natural person who was personally within the forum state when served. The present case is
not analogous to that context." Id. That reading of the case appears most plausible, even though the Supreme
Court was not so explicit in its majority opinion. One is left to wonder, for now, whether Justice Scalia, author
of both the Burnham and CT. Carden majority opinions, would agree with the assessment of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland.
105. Id. at 1020-22 (citing Springle v. Cottrell Eng'g Corp., 391 A.2d 456, 469 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978)).
106. Id. at 1022.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1023.
109. Id.
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tion as general partner to MWLP. The Court of Appeals held that such an imputa-
tion of breach to a general partner is disallowed under Maryland partnership law."'
IV. ANALYSIS
In Republic Properties Corp. v. Mission West Properties, L.P., the Court of Appeals of
Maryland upheld long-established due process protections''' and asserted that state
law and policy do not support forum shopping among corporate disputants." 2 Ma-
ryland adopted uniform partnership rules that encourage both business formation
in the state and investment by Maryland businesses elsewhere." 3 As established in
Della Ratta,"l4 these rules reflect modern commercial practices and needs, rather
than relying on common law doctrines that broaden potential liability."5 By view-
ing partnerships and limited partnerships as distinct legal bodies under the entity
theory, Maryland law provides the flexibility and predictability necessary for the
formation of effective business enterprises." 6 Specific to the law of personal juris-
diction, the new Maryland statutes governing partnerships mean that these associa-
tions no longer straddle every single state where a partner member was formed, is
domiciled, or conducts business. As a result, those with an interest in the partner-
ship can more accurately predict where that business entity is subject to suit."7 In
addition to comporting with the fundamental notions of International Shoe and its
progeny,"' this doctrine discourages litigants from filing lawsuits in distant forums
in hopes of achieving a better outcome.
This lawsuit represented a clear case of forum shopping by the plaintiffs." 9 All
the parties maintained their principal places of business in California; the HALP
partnership was formed in that state; and the disputed contracts and activities all
took place there. 20 The re-incorporation of MWI in Maryland in 1999 was the only
link to the state revealed by any of the disputants. The Republic partners must have
110. Id.
11. Id. at 1023.
112. Id. at 1013-14, 1023.
113. See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 9A-101 to 1205, 10-101 to 10-1105 (LexisNexis
2006); 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 403 (2007).
114. 856 A.2d 643, 650 (Md. 2004).
115. See Antonic Rigging & Erecting, Inc. v. Foundry E. Ltd., 773 F. Supp. 420, 429-30 (S.D. Ga. 1991);
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 40, § 103(a).
116. Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 393 (Md. 1999).
117. HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 46, § 201, Authors' Comments.
118. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that due process
must provide "a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable
to suit").
119. The Court of Appeals never used the phrase "forum shopping" in the opinion, much less scolded the
plaintiffs for their egregious exercise of the practice. Given the opportunity that the lawsuit presented for
Maryland's high court to clarify some complex and convoluted legal issues, they may have forgiven Republic
Properties Corporation for burdening the taxpayers of the state.
120. Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props., L.P., 895 A.2d 1006, 1008-11 (Md. 2006).
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foreseen some risk in bringing suit in California. Accordingly, they opted to try
their luck in Maryland, relying on outdated doctrine concerning partnerships. 2' At
the trial level, their gamble was a success.
This original outcome and the facts of Republic Properties reveal why modern
business expectations militate for the entity conception and require its proper ap-
plication. HALP, the limited partnership at issue, consisted not solely of individu-
als, but of an amalgamation of individuals and various business entities.'22 The
limited partnership they forged likely facilitated financing and investing for the
parties while increasing individual operability and limiting personal liability.'23 One
defendant to this suit, MWLP, was a limited partnership that served as a general
partner in HALP.'24 The other defendant, MWI, was a corporation that served as
general partner to MWLP,2 5 but that did not participate directly in HALP.'26 So
the two defendant entities were in a direct partnership relationship, but only one of
them, MWLP, maintained the separate partnership relation with the HALP group.
As confusing as these arrangements appear,'27 the parties clearly established their
various limited partnerships to achieve their mercantile purposes efficiently, effec-
tively, and in ways that limited their respective liabilities.'28 The needs of these
various parties hardly resemble the example of A and B forming Carroll Clean-
ers. "'29 Accordingly, the law must reflect and support their legitimate expectations-
and does under the entity theory of partnerships by affording the participants
greater autonomy and additional protection from the broad liability of past
doctrine.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the entity theory explicit in Maryland
law. 3° Under the former conception of partnerships, when MWI became a Mary-
land business, MWLP also would have become subject to Maryland law under the
aggregate theory.' 3' Common law would view MWI and MWLP as a single business
121. Id. at 1012. The Mission West defendants in the Maryland suit filed their own suit in California on
February 26, 2001. Brief of Respondents at 11, Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props., L.P., 895 A.2d 1006
(Md. 2006) (No. 41).
122. Republic Props., 895 A.2d at 1008. HALP consisted of a limited partnership, a corporation, a limited
liability company, and two individuals. Id. at 1024.
123. See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate General Partners of Limited Partnerships, I J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 73, 73-74 (1997).
124. Republic Props., 895 A.2d at 1008.
125. MWI was a REIT, established to manage and lease commercial properties. Brief of Respondents at 4,
895 A.2d 1006. A limited partnership with a REIT as corporate general partner represents a common and
advantageous way to conduct a real estate development business. See Hamilton, supra note 123, at 85.
126. Republic Props., 895 A.2d at 1008.
127. The Court of Appeals noted of the arrangements that "you can't tell the players without a program."
Id. at 1008 n.l (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Hamilton, supra note 123, at 73.
129. See supra Part II.A.
130. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-201 (LexisNexis 2006).
131. See Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (Ohio 1994) (asserting that "a partnership is an
aggregate of individuals and does not constitute a separate legal entity").
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association. Maryland's current partnership law, however, allows these entities to
remain legally autonomous to a greater degree.'32 MWI is subject to the jurisdiction
of states where it incorporated, maintains a principal place of business, or main-
tains sufficient contacts; MWLP is subject to distinct jurisdictional review.'33 Like-
wise, any legal claims asserted against MWLP independently do not automatically
impute to MWI as a general partner merely through the existence of the limited
partnership."' The Court of Appeals correctly applied the law by examining the
circumstances of the lawsuit independently for both defendants-and thereby
maintained Maryland's business- and investment-friendly environment.
The decision also upheld clear due process safeguards while not undermining the
authority of Maryland trial courts. Maryland's long-arm statute'35 and process ser-
vice rules'36 were established, in part, to ensure that courts offered aggrieved state
citizens full recourse for legally-actionable harms.'37 The long-arm statute grants
jurisdiction over any person properly served with process in the state. 3 ' The Court
of Appeals reaffirmed two important doctrines. First, the service-as-jurisdiction
doctrine only applies to individuals (in the mode of Burnham) or to the specific
entity that maintains an agent in the state ready to accept process.'39 Secondly, the
full requirements for a Maryland court to claim jurisdiction are (1) proper service;
(2) qualification under the long-arm; and (3) qualification under the "minimum
contacts" doctrine.40 Those requirements simply were not met regarding MWLP,
so the Court properly dismissed the suit against that entity.
The case revealed how partnership and procedural law each must be applied with
reference to and understanding of the other. Republic Properties ostensibly was de-
cided on procedural grounds: the Court deemed that Maryland lacked jurisdiction
over MWLP. 4' Embedded in that determination, however, were core conceptual
changes to Maryland's business law. 4 2 The Republic plaintiffs prevailed at trial on
132. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 9A-101 to 9A-1205.
133. See Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props., L.P., 895 A.2d 1006, 1022 (Md. 2006) (finding that
foreign limited partnerships should be viewed like foreign corporations in jurisdictional review); CHARLES
ALLAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 4A FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1069.4 (3d ed. 1998) (asserting
that foreign corporations and their subsidiaries usually must be treated to separate jurisdictional review).
134. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-306(c). Note that under Maryland law and the RUPA, all
partners generally are liable for the obligations of the partnership, so if Republic Properties obtained a judg-
ment against MWLP in California, then MWI could be compelled to make a contribution. However, Maryland
law and RUPA require that partnership assets be exhausted first before creditors reach out to partners. Id. § 9A-
307; REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 307 (1997). This represents another important implementation of the entity
theory.
135. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 6-101 to 6-104 (LexisNexis 2006).
136. MD. RULE 2-111 to 126, 3-111 to 126 (2006).
137. Auerbach, supra note 83, 39-44.
138. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-102(a).
139. Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props., L.P., 895 A.2d 1006, 1021-22 (Md. 2006).
140. Id. at 1022.
141. Id. at 1023.
142. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-201 (LexisNexis 2006).
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the lack of clarity that still exists regarding twenty-first century partnerships and
how they differ from their common law antecedents. 43 Maryland courts now have
a practical template for analyzing litigation involving these venerable, but much-
altered, business forms.
The Court drew a clear and sensible line in Republic Properties between rules to
promote business and investment growth in the state, and rules that offer residents
proper legal recourse to their conflicts. The line favors the creation and expansion
of commercial enterprises in Maryland without sacrificing protections for its citi-
zens. In fact, the decision asserts legal protections for citizen business entities by
unequivocally implementing the entity theory of partnership. The decision warns
forum shopping plaintiffs that Maryland courts will not countenance lawsuits
based on attenuated procedural moves and that, in fairness, should be brought in a
different state.
V. CONCLUSION
In Republic Properties Corp., the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified the state's
new uniform partnership laws and generated a positive and practical outcome for
state business associations.'44 Maryland law expressly views partnerships and lim-
ited partnerships as legal entities distinct from their partner members. 5 This en-
tity theory doctrine reflects the realities and needs of contemporary business
associations. " ' It also promotes the formation of businesses and growth in invest-
ment through the partnership model. Most states adopted the same uniform part-
nership act as Maryland, but confusion concerning the change from the common
law aggregate theory of these businesses to the entity theory persists. 7 Practically
speaking, the ruling in Republic Properties discourages forum shopping by out-of-
state plaintiffs in certain classes of business disputes. The decision does not, how-
ever, diminish any of the legal rights or recourse of Maryland citizens. Instead, it
clarifies the longstanding requirements for state courts to properly assert authority
over defendants in civil litigation. " 8 The decision in Republic Properties will stand
as a strong and clear application of new partnership law, allowing businesses and
investors to better predict the future legal landscape in Maryland and other juris-
dictions. Lastly, the Court's decision also removes Maryland from the list of de
facto favorable destinations for foreign business plaintiffs.
143. Mission W. Props., L.P. v. Republic Props. Corp., 873 A.2d 372, 384-85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005),
affd, 895 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2006).
144. Republic Props., 895 A.2d at 1013.
145. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 9A-201.
146. REVISED UNIF. P'sHmi ACT prefatory statement (1997).
147. Cole, supra note 9, at 91-93.
148. Springle v. Cottrell Eng'g Corp., 391 A.2d 456, 469 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
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